Belief functions, possibility measures and Choquet capacities of order 2, which are special kinds of coherent upper or lower probability, are amongst the most popular mathematical models for uncertainty and partial ignorance. I give examples to show that these models are not sufficiently general to represent some common types of uncertainty. Coherent lower previsions and sets of probability measures are considerably more general but they may not be sufficiently informative for some purposes. I discuss two other models for uncertainty, involving sets of desirable gambles and partial preference orderings. These are more informative and more general than the previous models, and they may provide a suitable mathematical setting for a unified theory of imprecise probability.
Introduction
Can there be a unified theory of imprecise probability? At present there are numerous mathematical models, interpretations and applications of imprecise probabilities. As a general or unified theory may be expected to accommodate this variety of mathematical models, interpretations and applications, it may appear that such a theory will be difficult to attain.
My view is that a single theory of imprecise probability, as in [22] , can accommodate all the kinds of uncertainty and partial ignorance that are currently being studied, including vague or qualitative judgements of uncertainty, complete ignorance and near ignorance, random sets and multivalued mappings, and partial information about an unknown probability measure. To defend this view it is necessary to examine these types of uncertainty in some detail, and this has been attempted in [22, 23, 26] .
My aim in this paper is more limited: to consider what level of mathematical generality will be needed in a unified theory of imprecise probability. I will argue that none of the mathematical models that are most popular at present (numbers 1-4 in the list below) is sufficiently general, and I will suggest several other models that do seem to be sufficiently general but have received less attention than they deserve. By a 'sufficiently general' model, I mean one that can represent all the types of uncertainty and partial ignorance that are commonly encountered in applications.
The mathematical models that I consider are, in order of increasing generality, 1. possibility measures and necessity measures [4, 33] 2. belief functions and plausibility functions [2, 18] 3. Choquet capacities of order 2 [1, 3] 4. coherent upper and lower probabilities [13, 19] 5. coherent upper and lower previsions [22, 23, 24, 31] 6. sets of probability measures [9, 15] 7. sets of desirable gambles [22, 30, 32] 8. partial preference orderings [8, 22] .
Another important type of model, which can be regarded as a special case of models 5-8 but which does not fit neatly into the preceding list, is 9. partial comparative probability orderings [5, 11, 12] .
I think that all the models I have listed are appropriate and useful in particular types of application. Some well known examples are: (1) vague judgements of uncertainty in natural language; (2) multivalued mappings and non-specific information; (3) some types of statistical neighbourhood in robustness studies, and various economic applications; (4) personal betting rates, and upper and lower bounds for probabilities; (5) buying and selling prices for gambles, and envelopes of expert opinions; (6) partial information about an unknown probability measure; (7, 8) judgements of the desirability of, or preference between, gambles; and (9) qualitative judgements of uncertainty.
If each of these models is useful in some types of application, of course it follows that a sufficiently general model should include all the listed models as special cases. This argument supports the most general of the models, 7 and 8, as the most promising candidates for a unified theory. In the rest of the paper I develop this argument by examining the mathematical models and the relationships between them in more detail, especially with regard to their mathematical generality. I have already discussed possibility measures and belief functions in [23] . In this paper I consider models 3-8 in order of increasing generality.
Almost all of the results in this paper have been discussed in my previous work, especially in [22, 23] . Nevertheless I feel that it is important to review these results at this symposium, because the choice of a mathematical model is a fundamental issue and many people continue to advocate models which have limited applicability.
My argument is based largely on examples which show that models 3-6 are not sufficiently general. To simplify the argument, I have chosen the examples to be as simple as possible and to involve only 3 or 4 possible outcomes. The phenomena illustrated in the examples are not restricted to small problems but actually occur more frequently in larger problems.
Choquet Capacities of Order 2
Let denote the set of possibilities under consideration.
Suppose that lower probabilities PA are defined for all A 2 K, where K is a collection of subsets of . In this section K is assumed to be an algebra. For models [1] [2] [3] [4] in the earlier list, lower probabilities determine conjugate upper probabilities through PA = 1 , PA c , so it suffices to consider lower probabilities.
Assume that 0 PA 1 for all A 2 K , P; = 0 and P = 1 . The lower probability P is said to be 2-monotone, or a Choquet capacity of order 2, when it also satisfies, whenever A and B are in K, PA B + PA B PA + PB:
It is well known that probability measures, belief functions and necessity measures (the conjugates of possibility measures) are always 2-monotone lower probabilities. A simple method of constructing 2-monotone lower probabilities is to apply a convex transformation to the probability interval: if P 0 is a probability measure on K, f is a convex function from 0; 1 into 0; 1 with f0 = 0, and P is defined by P = 1 and PA = fP 0 A when A 2 K and A 6 = , then P is a 2-monotone lower probability.
Many of the neighbourhood models used in Bayesian and frequentist studies of robust statistics are of this form [25] .
To show that order-2 capacities are not sufficiently general, I will give a simple example of coherent lower probabilities that are not 2-monotone. This example also shows that belief functions and necessity or possibility measures are not sufficiently general, since these models are special types of order-2 capacities. In my experience, most of the coherent lower probability models that occur in applications are not 2-monotone. 
Coherent Lower Probabilities
The simplest mathematical characterization of coherent lower probabilities is that they are lower envelopes of a set of probability measures. That is, lower probabilities P, defined on K, are coherent if and only if there is a nonempty set of probability measures, M, such that PA = inf fPA : P 2 M g for all A 2 K . Another characterization in terms of positive linear combinations of desirable gambles, which shows that coherence is a normative requirement of consistency, is given in [22, 23, 24] .
All 2-monotone lower probabilities are coherent [20] . Example 1 therefore shows that coherence is more general than 2-monotonicity. But coherent lower probabilities are still not sufficiently general, for the following reasons.
(a) They cannot model comparative probability judgements such as "event A is at least as probable as B" or "A is at least c times as probable as B".
(b) They do not determine unique lower (or upper) expectations, which are needed in making decisions.
(c) They do not determine unique conditional lower (or upper) probabilities, which are needed in making inferences.
(d) Even in problems where lower probabilities are an adequate model for an initial state of uncertainty, after we condition on a subset of , the updated lower probabilities may no longer be adequate because they have lost relevant information [10] .
Problems (a), (b) and (c) can be illustrated by a single example involving comparative probability judgements; similar examples are in [14] and [22] In view of these inadequacies of upper and lower probabilities, why have they received so much attention in the literature on imprecise probability? I think that this is due largely to an uncritical acceptance of the traditional approach of probability theory. A precise probability measure P does determine unique expectations, through the formula E P X = P !2 X!Pf!g if is finite, and E is the unique linear expectation operator whose restriction to events is P. Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between probability measures and linear expectations, and no information is lost when uncertainty is specified in terms of a probability measure. Also a probability measure P determines unique conditional probabilities through the formula PAjB = PA B=PB (Bayes' rule), provided that PB 0. This explains why probability theory can be formulated in terms of unconditional probabilities. Nevertheless, there are some advantages in formulating probability theory in terms of expectations or previsions, as in [6, 29] , and, as de Finetti [6] recognized, the usual formulation is inadequate for dealing with conditioning events that have probability zero. The case PB = 0 is discussed in later sections.
It is clear from (b) and (c) above that these properties of probability measures do not generalize to lower probabilities. Lower probabilities are not sufficiently informative to determine unique lower expectations or unique conditional lower probabilities. In my experience, lower probabilities are inadequate models in many applications, including most applications in which imprecise probability models are constructed from sets of probability measures, as in Example 1, or from qualitative judgements of uncertainty, as in Example 2.
Upper and lower probability models which are not necessarily coherent, including fuzzy measures [27] (also known as Choquet capacities of order 1), are mathematically more general than coherent upper and lower probabilities but they are inadequate for the same reasons: as set functions, they are not sufficiently informative about upper and lower expectations and conditional probabilities.
Coherent Lower Previsions
A bounded mapping from to IR (the real numbers) is called a gamble. Let K be a nonempty set of gambles. A mapping P : K ! IR is called a lower prevision or lower expectation. A lower prevision is said to be coherent when it is the lower envelope of some set of linear expectations, i.e., when there is a nonempty set of probability measures, M, such that PX = inf fE P X : P 2 Mg for all X 2 K , where E P X denotes the expectation of X with respect to P. The conjugate upper prevision is determined by PX = ,P,X. Coherent lower probabilities can be regarded as a special type of coherent lower prevision, by taking K to be a set of indicator functions of subsets of and identifying the lower probability of a subset with the lower prevision of its indicator function. For that reason, it is convenient to adopt de Finetti's convention of using the same symbol A to denote both a subset of and its indicator function.
Coherent Problems (e) and (f) are both caused by the inadequacy of the real-number scale. The same problems occur for precise probabilities, which of course are a special case of lower probability or lower prevision. Conditioning on events of probability zero causes real difficulties in Kolmogorov's theory of probability (Borel's paradox is a well known example): if PB = 0 then the conditional probability measure PjB is completely indeterminate. Also, if two gambles X and Y have the same expectation EX = EY then preferences between them are indeterminate: we may have X Y , Y X, or X Y (we are indifferent between X and Y ). It may seem that we should always be indifferent between X and Y when EX = EY , but if X Y and X! Y ! for some possible outcomes ! then we would surely prefer X to Y . De Finetti [6] considered using infinitesimals (nonstandard real numbers) to provide a richer scale for probability.
It is arguable that problems (e) and (f) are unimportant, because they concern infinitesimal differences in unconditional expected utility. In the Kolmogorov approach, it is often claimed that events of probability zero are negligible. That may be true before the conditioning event is observed, but after observing an event of probability zero, differences that were previously negligible may become important. In statistical problems with a continuous sample space, it is usual that all possible observations have (upper) probability zero, and then posterior probabilities based on the observation are indeterminate. Also, it is more common for an event to have lower probability zero than to have precise probability zero: on an epistemic interpretation, PB = 0 means only that there is no evidence at the present time to support the occurrence of B, not that it has no chance of occurring. In Example 6, for instance, we have PS = 0 but PS 0.
Problem (e) could be solved by taking conditional lower prevision to be the fundamental concept, and specifying PjB directly, when necessary, rather than attempting to define it in terms of unconditional lower previsions. That approach was followed in [6] for prevision and in [22] for lower prevision. But it does not solve problem (f).
Sets of Probability Measures
Can these problems be solved by using a set of probability measures as the mathematical model for uncertainty? It is immediately clear that the answer is no. In the special case of precise probability, the set of probability measures reduces to a single measure and the inadequacies of the real-number scale remain. More generally, there is a oneto-one correspondence between coherent lower previsions (defined on the set of all gambles) and nonempty closed convex sets of probability measures: the closed convex set is the set of all probability measures whose expectations dominate the lower prevision, and the lower prevision is the lower envelope of this set of expectations ( [22] , Thm. 3.6.1). Examples of closed convex sets of probability measures have been given in Examples 1-3. If we restrict attention to sets of probability measures M that are closed and convex, they are exactly as general as coherent lower previsions.
Greater generality might be achieved by dropping the requirement of convexity, but convexity of M does not appear to have any behavioural or practical significance, at least when the behaviour is generated by M alone. (This can change when we combine M with other sets of probability measures.) Any set M has exactly the same behavioural implications as its convex hull: both sets generate the same lower previsions and preference orderings. In Example 1, for instance, it makes no difference to preferences whether we are completely ignorant about the interaction between the two tosses, which produces the convex set M in Example 1 as the model for uncertainty, or we know that the second outcome is completely determined by the first through one of the two possible deterministic mechanisms, which produces the 2-point set containing the two extreme points of M.
A little more generality can be achieved by dropping the closure requirement. For example, if the three qualitative judgements in the football example are modified by replacing 'at least as probable as' by 'more probable than', the judgements determine an open set which is the interior of the set M in Example 2. The open set models a preference for W over D, since all the probability measures in it satisfy PW P D, whereas the closed set M contains probability measures with PW = PD and models only a weak preference for W over D. Distinguishing between open and closed sets of probability measures can therefore solve problem (f) in some cases.
Similarly, problem (e) can be avoided in some examples by using an open set of probability measures which does not assign probability zero to any conditioning event B but may have lower envelope PB = 0. Then conditional probabilities and lower probabilities are uniquely determined through Bayes' rule. In the coin-tossing Example 6, if we modify the set M by removing the extreme point 0; 1 2 ; 1 2 ; 0, then all probability measures in the modified set assign positive probability to S, and we obtain the unique conditional probabilities PHjS = PTjS = 1 2 .
Sets of probability measures can be a little more informative than coherent lower previsions, but they are still not sufficiently informative to avoid problems (e) and (f) 0). An additional conglomerability axiom, which implies stronger properties of coherence, was required in [22] .
A partial preference ordering is a partial ordering of the gambles in L. X Y is read as 'gamble X is preferred to gamble Y '. Coherent partial preference orderings can be characterized through a set of axioms that are closely related to D1-D4 ( [22] , Appendix F).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between coherent sets of desirable gambles and coherent partial preference orderings, defined by X Y if and only if X , Y 2 D .
(See [22] , p. 153, for justification.) With this correspondence, the two models are equally general. As mathematical objects, coherent sets of desirable gambles are simpler than coherent partial preference orderings because they eliminate some of the redundancy in the ordering. Here I concentrate on sets of desirable gambles, but all of the following discussion applies to partial preference orderings through the one-to-one correspondence.
A set of desirable gambles can retain all the information in the earlier models, and it can supply some additional information by specifying which of the gambles on the boundary of the set are desirable ( [22] , sec. 3.8.6 and App. F). This additional information is exactly what is needed to condition on events of probability zero and to distinguish preference from weak preference.
To see that all the information in the earlier models can be represented in terms of a set of desirable gambles, suppose that a coherent lower prevision P, defined on a set of gambles K, is given. Define D = fX 2 L : X P n i=1 c i X i , PX i + " for some n 0; c i 0; " 0; X i 2 K g : (4) Then D is a coherent set of desirable gambles, and P can be recovered from D by, for all X 2 K , PX = sup fc : X , c 2 D g :
Coherent lower probabilities are a special case of coherent lower previsions and so they can be recovered from D by PA = sup fc : A , c 2 D g .
Similarly, given a closed convex set of probability measures, M, define D = fX 2 L : X 0; or E P X 0; 8P 2 M g : (6) Then D is coherent and M can be recovered from it by M = fP : E P X 0; 8X 2 D g :
Example 7 Coin Tossing. Similarly, a comparative probability judgement "A is more probable than B" can be modeled by requiring that A , B 2 D , and "A is at least as probable as B" by requiring A , B + " 2 D for all " 0. Sets of desirable gambles are therefore more general than partial comparative probability orderings, which are a special type of partial preference ordering in which preferences are specified only between indicator functions of events. Partial comparative probability orderings are not sufficiently general because usually they do not determine lower probabilities, lower previsions and preferences between other gambles.
Coherent sets of desirable gambles, or (equivalently) coherent partial preference orderings, appear to be sufficiently general and sufficiently informative to model the common types of uncertainty and the most important aspects of uncertainty. Of course coherence is a normative (consistency) requirement and it is unlikely to be an accurate description of people's intuitive reasoning. Sets of desirable gambles or partial preference orderings which satisfy weaker properties than coherence, such as 'avoiding sure loss' or 'n-coherence' [22] , may be more useful as descriptive models.
Although sets of desirable gambles are more general than the previous models, they simplify the mathematical theory of coherence and natural extension [22] . For example, the generalized Bayes rule (3) A central idea of the theory in [22] is the idea of natural extension. Suppose we judge all the gambles in a set D 0 to be desirable, where D 0 is a subset of some coherent set but is not necessarily coherent. Then the natural extension of D 0 , denoted by D, is defined to be the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles that contains D 0 . So D is the smallest convex cone that contains D 0 and all positive gambles, and it can be generated from D 0 by applying the rules D2-D4 [32] . The coherent set D fully expresses the implications of the desirability judgements in D 0 . An important special case is that in which both and D 0 are finite sets. In that case the model D is said to be finitely generated ([22] , sec. 4.2). Finitely generated models occur frequently in practice, when the modeling or elicitation process produces a finite set of basic judgements which can be translated into judgements that particular gambles are desirable. A finitely generated set D produces, through (7), a closed convex set of probability measures, M, that has finitely many extreme points. 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 0; and X 6 = 0g. This D generates, through (7) , the set of probability measures M that was defined in Example 2, and, through (5) , the upper and lower probabilities in Example 2.
For finitely generated models, it is often convenient to calculate inferences directly from D 0 , rather than to first calculate the extreme points of M. Another argument in favour of partial preference orderings is that they are needed in a general theory of decision which allows imprecision in both probabilities and utilities, as in [7, 17, 21] . In a general theory of decision, the primary mathematical model will be some kind of partial preference ordering, of either the possible actions or more general objects such as randomized actions, Savage acts or horse lotteries. Such orderings might be constructed from separate assessments of imprecise probabilities and imprecise utilities, but it is important to recognize that not all the reasonable partial preference orderings can be constructed in this way. That is illustrated by the following example. See [17] for a similar conclusion. Compare this example with Savage's result [16] , that every reasonable complete preference ordering of acts can be constructed from separate assessments of a precise probability measure and a precise utility function. Partial preference orderings are more general than combinations of imprecise probability and imprecise utility. This is important because it shows that preferences need to be constructed in other ways, not just by assessing imprecise probabilities and imprecise utilities. A very general method of constructing a coherent partial preference ordering from simple judgements was outlined in [21] .
Conclusions
Until now, most studies of imprecise probability have been concerned with special types of upper and lower probability or with comparative probability orderings. I have argued that these models are not sufficiently general to represent some common types of uncertainty. In advocating a more general model, I am not suggesting that we should stop studying coherent upper and lower probabilities, Choquet capacities, belief functions, possibility measures and other special kinds of model. As I said in the introduction, each of these models is useful in special kinds of application, and each has special mathematical properties which make it interesting from a theoretical point of view. However, I suggest that much more effort should be devoted to studying the more general models which are needed in many applications.
Lower previsions are much more general and informative than lower probabilities, and they seem to be adequate models in the great majority of applications that are concerned with uncertainty but not with utility, and those applications in which utilities are precisely known. They also have an advantage of familiarity over the more general models: they are closer to well established concepts of probability and expectation, and especially to de Finetti's concept of prevision [6] .
There is a duality relationship between coherent lower previsions and sets of probability measures. Some aspects of the mathematical theory can be handled most conveniently with one model and some with the other. It is therefore important to be able to use both models and to exploit the duality. Coherent lower previsions have the advantage of being more closely related to preferences and behaviour than are sets of probability measures. Many authors, particularly those studying robust Bayesian inference, have not yet recognized that many of the things they are doing with sets of probability measures can be done more easily with coherent lower previsions. For example, simpler methods can be found for checking coherence and making inferences from precise or imprecise probability assessments [22, 24] . As another example, the main result of [28] was proved much more simply in [20] using only elementary properties of coherent lower previsions; see also [25] .
Sets of desirable gambles and partial preference orderings are the most informative of the mathematical models I have discussed, and they seem to be able to model all the common types of uncertainty. They uniquely determine upper and lower previsions and conditional previsions, and they contain all the information about preferences that is relevant in making decisions. In many ways they are the simplest and most natural mathematical models. The coherence axioms and rules of inference (natural extension) for sets of desirable gambles are especially simple. In this paper I have advocated these models on the grounds of mathematical generality, but it is also arguable that they are the simplest and most natural models from the point of view of interpretation [22] . I conclude that sets of desirable gambles and partial preference orderings may be the best mathematical models for a general theory of imprecise probability.
